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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------- -------- -------------
STATE OF UTAH, Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
EARL WARD CLEMENTS, Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
lliTRODUCTORYSTATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from the finding of the court below, stttrng 
wtthout a iury, of the conviction of second degree burglary, and from the 
sentence of the court to the Utah State Prison. 
The matter should be reversed without direction, or m the alter-
nati.ve reversed and remanded .tor a new trial on the merits consistent with 
procedural due process and consistent with a proper mdictment for the 
crin1e committed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The record on appeal consists of two volumes, one of which con-
tains pleadings, minute entries and similar papers, together with and 
numbered within the ftle separately, which ts the transcript of proceedings 
upon the trial. The other volume is a record of proceedings and the 
minute entries made, filed at a later date, consisting of five unnwnbered 
p«ges appearing to be the transcript of proceedings at the arraignment of 
the defend;:rnt-aypellant. References to the first volume will be desig-
nated by (R. page number, Tr. page number). References thus to the 
record where they are made to the trial transcript will show a parallel 
c Ltation, references to the record of proceedings for the arraignment and 
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appear mg man unconnected and unnumbered volume will sunply be made 
b~ genPral reierence to the supplemental record. 
After serLOus objection (Supp. R.) as to the trial of the matter 
concurrently, the learned trial judge raising the issue himself (R. 37, 
Tr. 4), and after the questLOn was determined by the Honorable John 
F. Wahlquist by his requirement to counsel that if the matter was to 
proceed upon joint trial the office of the District Attorney was to present 
a motion for consolidation (Supp. R. at 5), and it further appearing that 
an ex parte motion to consolidate was filed together with an unsigned order 
at (R. 14, 15). counsel apparently conceded m the concurrent trial. 
The matter proceeded upon trial without a jury, the District 
Attorney 1 s office presenting its evidence in alternative cross-fire order 
with respect to the co-defendant Peterson and back again with respect to 
the defendant-appellant Clements. 
The first witness called by the State testified briefly that he was 
the admmistrator of the Ogden Clinic and knew generally who had keys to 
the building and who didn't. The building manager did not know either 
of the defendants and prior to the date of trial had not seen either of them 
be fore. He further testified that to his knowledge they were not among 
those authorized to be present during after hours (R. 39, 40, Tr. 6, 7). 
The State's second witness, Patrolman Moore, testified that he 
responded to a call the evening of April 18th, 1970, at 11. 21 p.m. and was 
in the area so he went to inspect as a back-up man and was on the scene in 
forty seconds. He testified that he, upon observmg the south side, 
found 1t to be secure and " ... found all the windows secure. · . (Tr. at 
42)." Patrolman Moore then testified that he observed two men mside 
the clmic at the pharmacy door by the illumination from the parking lot 
lLghts shmmg mto the building and then later testified that the two defend-
ants m the courtroom (some six months later) were the two men he ob-
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S<' r vcd ms lde the Ogden Cl mic at the pharmacy door. Patrolman Moore 
d1d not observe the defendants accused the evemng of the alleged burglary 
after h10 observation at the Ogden Clinic pharmacy door. Patrolman 
Moore was not present when the defendants were taken into custody (Tr. 12). 
The next Stat<>'s w1tness, Sergeant Brooks, testified that he had 
held over forty minutes from his shift end to assist 11them". (Tr. 13). 
Sergeant Brooks searched the ground floor of the clinic together with 
Officer Cragun, and Lt was m Cragun's presence that the defendant-
app<>llant Clements was observed voluntarily coming out of a dead stair 
space closet. A rev1ew of the rather brief transcript of proceedmgs 
md1cates that there was confus10n m the mind of Officer Cragun and of 
Sergeant Brooks as to who placed Clements under arrest, and each of them 
testified they thought that Sergeant Stettler had read Clements a Miranda 
warning. The other testifying officers had to do with the co-defendant 
Pcten;on and none of them observed Clements on the scene or after the 
arrest. The record does show that the defendants were present at night, 
ma place they apparently were not supposed to be. There LS no ev1dence 
as to any stolen property or intent to commit larceny. A . 357 magnum 
revolver was found m the approxilnate area of defendant-appellant Clements' 
h1ding place but without reference to any identification, serial number, 
finger prints, and there was no testLmony that Clements knew of its pre-
sence or exercised any dominion or control over the same. The record 
goes on to show as a justification by Officer Coleman for dragg1ng the co-
defendant Peterson along down the hall rn the furtherance of the officer's 
search 10 - trespassers that six cartridges of the . 357 rnangum type were 
found 111 the defendant Peterson's pockets (Tr. 26, R. 59). The State's 
Exhibit A, . 357 mangun 1 revolver, Exhibit B, Sl){ cartridges, and a 
second. 357 revolver by st1pulat10n 10und rn the defendant-appellant 
Cle1ne nt 51 automobile without regard to tts loca tLon, we re oife red and 
received by the trial Judge as evidence. 
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The defendant-appellant Clements was found guilty and sentenced 
to the Utah State Prison for a term of from one to twenty years and particular 
ly charged with and found guilty of violation of Utah Code Annotated, § 76-9-3 
(1969 Supp.). The provision referred to is quoted in full text hereinbelow: 
''Every person who forcibly breaks and enters, or without 
force enters an open door, window or other aperture, of any 
house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, 
mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, or any tent, 
sheep or cattle camp, vessel, watercraft, railroad car, auto-
mobile, automobile trailer, aeroplane or aircraft with intent 
to commit larceny or any felony, ts guilty of burglary in the 
second degree. 11 
The above quoted statute was recently amended and the admittedly tenuous 
distinction between daytune and nighttime is no longer tmportant with respect 
to the degree of burglary committed. The Legislature in its wisdom added 
a new crune, that 1s, being somewhere one should not be, and is set forth 1n 
76-9-9 (1969 Supp.) with the designation thereof "misdemeanor. 11 
POINT I ----
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
CONVICTION OF SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY 
It is defendant-appellant's position that the amended statute with 
regard to second degree burglary still requires, to be constitutionally 
valid, a specific intent. At common law and prior to the statutory 
amendment discussed herein, the crime of burglary required a specific 
mtent. Roberts v. State, 136 Tex. App. 138, 124 S. W. 128; Hooks v. 
State, 145 Tenn. 43, 389 S. W. 529. The gist of the crime with regard 
to intent is well explained tn People v. Morton, 4 Utah 407, 11 Pac. 512 
(188b), wherein the court concluded that a previous plan to commit larceny 
taken together with a breaking and entering at night and burglary tools 
consistmg of a drill bit and others, were sufficient to sustain the element 
of the necessary larcenous or felonious intent. It is conceded by 
f f th neces sary intent may be unplied from circwn-appellant that proo o e 
declaration, the possession of recently stolen stances and by legislative 
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property raLses the Lnference without a counter explanation. Utah Code 
Annotated, § 76-38-1 (1953). 
The record m the mstant proceedmgs shows only that the accused 
was found ma place he wasn't supposed to be - that ts all~ Even though 
one officer stayed twenty mtnutes past the end of hts shift to "asstst them" 
and further that wtthm flve minutes there were etght patrol cars on the 
scene, the record falls to disclose any evLdence of burglary or tools, 
there was no stolen property, and it LS not even clear who arrested the 
defendant-appellant Clements. 
This Court as a reviewing court should not arbitrarily tamper 
with evidence or proof where there is conflict m test=ony and particularly 
where there has been a jury determinat10n. In the Lnstant case, however, 
the conviction and the necessary facts to sustaLn that conviction were found 
by the court and not by a jury, and it is vigorously argued by appellant 
Clements that, as in the case of State v. Pratt, 25 Utah 2d. 76, 475 Pac. 
Zd 1013 (1970), this Court could review the record as a whole and should 
reverse where the prosecutor's case in chief, the testimony taken as a 
whole, ts wholly tnsuffictent to prove the crime as charged. In State v. 
Pratt, supra, at page 1014 of the Pacific Reporter, this Court observed 
. that defendant's presence at the scene of a wrong-
doing is msufflcient to show his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. " 
Uthe applicable law relating to the crlffie of second degree burglar 
requires as part of the prosecutor's case Ln chief, a proof beyond reason-
able doubt of a specific intent to commit larceny or some other felony, 
the delc-adant-appellant Clements is and was justified in not presenting 
evidence of mtoxicat10n at the time m his own behalf. The officers 
who observed Clements emerge from his hidmg place did not volunteer 
these facts, nor where they asked. The defendant-appellant Clements 
was represented by counsel at the trial, and who could not reasonably 
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have been anticipating a convictlOn and not reasonably faLling to adduce or 
elicit testimony with respect to Clements 1 intoxication at the ti.zne, dLd not 
raise any facts Ln regard to Clernents 1 mtox1cation. It is not clear from 
the present amendment to the statute relating to second degree burglary 
whether the legislative mtent to abandon the specific mtent relating to 
burglary LS made an element of the crilne or not. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTE UPON WHICH CONVICTION WAS MADE IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; ITS REQUIREMENTS BEING AM-
BIGUOUS, VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN 
The requirement that a penal provision or enactment by the people 
the violation of which may be the subject of ilnprcsonment, must set forth 
with particularcty the acts or conduct making the elements of the crilne 
well known to the publ1c at large. This LS so in the mst!illt case by virtue 
of the record fa1ling to reflect the otherwise ava1lable defense of heavy 
intoxication which, prlOr to the amendment to the second degree burglary 
statute, would have been an absolute defense. If counsel for defendant 
Clements did not ra1se the defense because by the terms of the statute it 
was so ambiguous as to whether or not it would be a valid defense, and 
whether or not the court on its own motion should have inquired into the 
state of mind of defendant, and whether or not the prosecutor and his 
witnesses had a duty to do so, is all uncertain and unclear by the very 
terms of the statute with which defendant was charged. If the legislative 
intent with respect to the statutory amendment for second degree burglary 
was to eliminate the requirement of specific intent, then it is submitted 
that at common law the gist of the crime of burglary was the breaking of 
a place of storage of chattels or man's habitat with felonious intent at 
the time of entry, that the crime of second degree burglary must still 
require the necessary larcenous intent. 
It LS submitted that voluntary 
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intoxication is no defense to a cri.cne that does not require a specific intent. 
The concept 1s broadly expressed and stated m Nieto v. People, 383 Pac. 
2d 321 (Colo. 1963). In the case of State v. Turner 3 Utah 2d 28 5, 282 
Pac. 2d 1045 (1955), this Court affirmed the conv1ctwn where assigned 
error was based on a failure to instruct on defense of intoxication, the 
Court concluding that the crime of sodomy did not require a specific intent 
as an element of the crime. That voluntary intoxication or severe and 
uncontrolled hallucinations caused by intoxication and other factors not 
completely within the control of defendant are recognized as a valid defense 
to the crime of burglary is recognized m State v. Pellay, 7 Utah 2d 308, 
324 Pac. 2d 490 (1958), wherein great weight withm the record and sub-
mltted separately to the JUry was whether or not, m view of his drinkmg, 
the defendant had entered for an mnocent or a felonious purpose. The 
rule of law 1n this state 1s set forth quite clearly citing previous cases 
dealing with first degree murder wh1ch 1 also require a specific intent 1 
rn State v. Hartley, 16 Utah 2d 123, 396 Pac. 2d 749 (1964) as follows: 
''Thus
1 
a night tune forcible entry to a houseJ or an entry 
without force through an open door, with mtent to commit 
larceny, is second degree burglary. But, if on account 
of voluntary mtoxication the accused did not have the nec-
essary mtent to commit larceny, the iury should take mto 
consideration the evidence of intoxication in determining 
the existence of the necessary mtent (396 Pac. 2d at 750)." 
It 1s submitted by appellant herein that because of the ambiguity 
of the statute presently relating to second degree burglary, conviction could 
now or then be had without proof of specific mtent, then the defense of the 
Of m md was reasonably and Justifiably not made d<>fe ndant - a ppe Hant' s state 
a part of the record below. 
That this Court should consider or remand for a new trial the 
basic argwnents raised herein do not absolve defendant-appellant from 
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his acts completely but simply do not present a case for the commission 
of the crime with which defendant · d was conv1cte and sentenced to prison. 
In reversing the conviction of first degree murder and ordering 
a new trial, this Court recognized its duty with regard to prejudicial errors 
not previously assigned or argued m the record below as follows; 
" · · .. yet thi.s Court ... may and should sua sponte 
consider manifest and prejudicial errors which are neither 
assigned nor argued. State v. Stenback, 2 Pac. 2d 1050 
(Utah 1931); State v. Riley, 41 Utah 225, 126 Pac. 294 
( 1911). " 
In State v. Stenback, supra, the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah at 2 Pac. 2d 1054 observed with regard to mtox1cation that: 
11 
••• 1£ at the time of the commission of such an offense 
the accused was by mtoxication so entirely deprived of his 
reason that he did not have the mental capacity to enter-
tain the necessary specific intent which ts required to 
constitute a cri..rne, he must necessarily be acquitted; 
and in like manner the fact of defendant's drunkenness 
should be considered in determining the degree of the 
cri..rne. This ts so, not because drunkenness excuses 
c r Lme but because if the mental status required by law to 
constitute crime be one of specific intent or of delibera-
tion and premeditation, and drunkenness excludes the 
existence of such mental state, then the particular crllne 
charged has not m fact been committed." 
POINT III ------
THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS RESULTING IN THE CON-
VICTION OF THE DEFENDANTS WERE SO FRAUGHT 
WITH SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ERROR THAT 
THE RIGHTS OF APPELLANT WERE MATERIALLY 
PREJUDICED 
Defendant-appellant Clements did not raise the defense of 
intoxLcation 1n the proceedings below, nor d1d his counsel move for a new 
trial. Defendant's state of mind was affected both by voluntary consump-
t1on of liquor and the imb1bement of drugs causmg a state of mind undefin-
able but clearly absolving any mtent necessary if the crime was still 
requirement of the degree of intent prior to the statutory amendment. 
It ls submitted that there is a direct pecuniary conflict of interest wherein 
defense counsel could not consistently ask the court for a new trial with 
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respect to certain evtdence being preserved ior the payment of his fee 
(R. 76, 77, Tr. 43, 44). 
It is to be further noted that the defense was not within the 
an1bient of 
11
newly discovered evidence 11 necessary to preserve defendantrs 
mot10n lor a new trial beyond the time limits set forth in Utah Code Anno-
tated, § 77-38-4 (1953). 
The failure to move for a new trial and present cowisel 1s 
mabiltty to do so is further compounded by the procedural error m 
transmitting the record herein to the Supreme Court which, by recent 
amendment to the Code of Crimmal Procedure, requires that such record 
be transmitted within thirty days after filing of Notice of Appeal, when, 
m fact, the record was held up in the Second Judicial District Clerk's 
office for approximately seventy days. 
Appellant is not unmindful of the general principle of mere 
errors 1n procedure cannot be treated as a denial of due process (Gruger 
v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728 (1948). The i.nstant case, however, involves 
the application of a recently amended penal statute, it mvolves procedural 
errors constituting a sixty day delay m transmitting the record on appeal, 
and it further involves a maxinnun prison sentence of twenty years. Pre-
sent coW1sel is concerned with the joint trial when there was never any 
order signed m the record allowing tor such consolidation, and with the 
discussion with previous tr1al counsel the apparent continuing of the trial 
at the request of the District Attorney of the Second Judicial District m 
order not to insure a ia1r resolution of the facts or whether the crime had 
been committed, but in order to insure that the defendants would not be 
r0leased on a writ of habeas corpus. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted by appellant-defendant Clements 
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that m order to comply with the minimal requirements of procedural due 
process and fairness, the matter should be reversed and remanded wLth 
a view to construing the statute under which he was convicted as not chang-
mg the elements of the crime of second degree burglary as they existed 
at common law and upon the enactment of the United States Constitution 
and thus allowing him, where the office of the prosecuting attorney below 
did not feel a duty to do so, to present his defense of state of mind proving 
beyond doubt that the crime was not, rn fact, committed. 
Dated: 
Respectfully submitted, 
Mayllth, 1971 
'--
John R. Anderson 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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